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PREFACE
This thesis considers the changes in United States 
relations with the Soviet Union after World War II. In 
discussing the major events which shaped the changes in 
policy, I have not addressed the details of the events 
themselves, since each in itself is worthy of a complete, 
volume. Instead, I have limited my discussion to the broad 
indicators of diplomatic policy changes which resulted from 
the events.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, head of the University of Omaha 
History Department and to his associate, Dr. Paul L. Becko 
Seminar courses in historic research conducted by 
Dr. Trickett, in which I was fortunate enough to be enrolled 
for three semesters, provided me with the necessary basic 
guidelines and techniques upon which to proceed with this 
thesis. For the thesis paper itself, Dr. Beck has rendered 
many hours of detailed perusal, assistance, and advice as 
the paper has progressed from draft to format for Submission 
to the University. For his criticisms and critiques, I am 
most appreciative.
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"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World."
Halford MacKinder
"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who 
rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the 
world."
Nicolas Spykman
ii
INTRODUCTION
During World War II, when it became apparent
that Germany would attack Russia, both Prime Minister
Churchill and President Roosevelt were inclined to
welcome full cooperation with Russia. Churchill
remarked on June 21, 1941, that "If Hitler invaded Hell
I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil
1
in the House of Commons."’ In actuality much more, than
a "favorable reference" was forthcoming. A massive
program of military aid was promised and delivered by
2
both the United States and Britian, and of equal 
importance, a three poWer military alliance was formed
1
Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 370.
2
General Augustin Guillaume, Soviet Arms and Soviet 
Power (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), pp. 90-91.
Aid from the United States was governed by the Lend-Lease 
Agreement, concluded on June 11, 1942. The material furnished 
from the end of 1942 on under this agreement totalled 
17,500,000 tons, or 2,600 shiploads of all types of war mak­
ing vehicles as well as basic essentials for life sustenance. 
England furnished 3,800 tanks, 6,800 aircraft and 2,000 tons 
of copper.
2to combat the Nazis from three directions. Churchill reflected
the feelings of his nation when he said in December, 1941:
...the glorious steadfastness and energy with 
which they /the Russian Armies7 have resisted 
...have now been made plain...We must faith­
fully and punctually fulfill the very serious 
undertakings we have made to Russia...^
' Both the United States and England's undertakings
proved successful; consequently, by 1943 it became obvious
that victory in the war must ultimately rest with the Allies.
Therefore, in November 1943 the leaders of the Big Three met
at Teheran, and for the first time, seriously discussed postwar
policies and problems. A cooperative tendency among the
leaders, which had been established during the three trying
years of combat against a common enemy, was still prevalent
at Teheran and led to general agreements regarding postwar
problems, particularly that of the establishment of a United 
4
Nations. As a finale, the Big Three stated that "We came 
here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in
3
Winston S. Churchill, The Unrelenting Struggle 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942), pp. 345-346.
4
State Department Bulletin, Vol IX, December 1, 1943,
p. 409.
35
fact, in spirit and in purpose."
The "spirit of Teheran" persisted among the Big
Three during 1944. As allied armies closed on Germany from
east and west, there was a general feeling of acceptance in
England and the United States for Uncle Joe Stalin and the
6
glorious Red Army.
Yet by the beginning of 1945 a feeling of apprehen­
sion was developing regarding Russia's intentions in the 
' postwar world. Roosevelt remarked in his annual message to 
Congress on January 6, 1945, that "the nearer we come to
vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become
7
conscious of differences among victors."
5 *Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers-, 1946) , p. 113. Possibly a
hint of a future, in which Russia would respect only force,
was rendered by Stalin in an argument with Churchill. The
English Prime Minister had quoted an opinion of the Pope on
the particular subject. Stalin merely replied: "How many
divisions has he got?" See James F. Byrnes, All in One
Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958),
p. 363.'
6State Department Bulletin, Vol XII, January 7, 1945, 
p. 23. Prime Minister Churchill referred to Stalin as "Uncle 
Joe" on January 9, 1945, in a letter to President Roosevelt.
See U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States, The Confer­
ence of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955), r.. 32.
The first chapter of this paper will investigate the 
causes, events, and policies which precipitated the bipolari­
zation of world powers after World War II. Enigmatically 
perhaps, such bipolarization would include a split among the 
wartime Big Three and would align former enemies, Germany and 
Japan, with the Western Allies against the Soviet Union in a 
policy of containment around the Soviet territorial periphery 
or rimland.
5CHAPTER I
THE DETERIORATION OF THE WARTIME ALLIANCE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION
The postwar age actually began in early February,
1945, at the Big Three meeting conducted at Yalta in the
Crimea. In selecting a location for the meeting, Stalin
stated that the military situation on the Eastern Front
demanded his presence in Russia; therefore, he insisted on
the Crimea as the site of the conference. Roosevelt, who
in top military advisor William Leahy's opinion was already
an ill and worn-out individual, was forced to undertake the
difficult trip to Russia via a stopover at Malta. He was
accompanied by a host of political and military advisors,
including Secretary of State Stettinius and "Assistant
President" Byrnes. Churchill and Stalin likewise had their
8top aids in attendance.
At Yalta it was clear to the conferees that the 
end of hostilities was "in sight," and consequently, a
8
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New 
Yorks Whittlesey House, 1950) , pp., 297-299.
69
determination of postwar policies was required. It was also
obvious that England was no longer to play the star role in
international relations, because the United States and the
Soviet Union had clearly emerged as super-national powers
which would dominate the postwar world. The unknown factor
in the equation was the degree of cooperation which could
reasonably be expected between the new dominant powers of 
10
state.
The United States delegation approached Yalta with 
some uneasiness. In December, 1944, Roosevelt had become 
disturbed by reports of Stalin's support for the Lublin 
(Communist) Government of Poland rather than for the Free 
Polish Government in exile in England. The President wrote 
to Stalin on December 16, 1944, requesting that Russia do
11
nothing in Poland until the issue was discussed at Yalta.
On December 27, 1944, Stalin replied in effect to the President
12
that he should mind his own business. On December 30, 1944, 
Roosevelt again wrote Stalin expressing his concern for
9Ibid., pp. 302-322.
10
John H. Jackson, The World in the Postwar Decade 
1945-1955 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 3.
11u • s •* Foreign Relations of the United States, The 
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 218.
12
Ibid., p. 221-223.
Poland, but to no avail. Stalin replied on January 1, 1945, 
that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had on 
December 27 decided to r ecognize the Provisional Government
M I Jof Poland as soon as it is formed."
Yalta then was the initial encounter of the Cold
War, coming as it did after the Soviet Presidium's action
in regard to Poland's Communist government.
Actually, negotiations at Yalta proceeded smoothly
at first. The Big Three Leaders had emerged unscathed in
the war as a result of tremendous personal efforts as well
as those on the part of their countrymen. Unquestionably,
at Yalta at least some of the wartime "team spirit" still
persisted among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. They were
proud of the exclusive nature of their "club" and even joked
about it. For example, at one point in the conference,
Churchill remarked that the entrance fee for the Big Three
was 5,000,000 soldiers. "Stalin must have bitterly reflected
that the entrance fee that Russia had paid was more than five
14million dead soldiers."
13Ibid.. p. 226.
14Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography
(New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 526.
8As the Yalta Conference progressed, the Big Three 
found acceptable solutions to problems such as the composi­
tion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the final
plans for the defeat of Germany, and the terms for Russian
15
entry into the war with Japan. Even on the controversial
subject of Poland there was at least a tacit understanding.
Stalin agreed to a new government in Poland to replace the
Lublin regime. The new government was to be "reorganized on
a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic
16
leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad."
All three nations considered Yalta a success at 
its conclusion.
Stalin toasted: "...to the firmness of our Three-
15Leahy, p. 320. Concessions made by the U.S. 
to Russia were attributed to the military situation which 
existed at the time: In Europe, territory lost to the 
Germans in the Battle of the Bulge was only recently 
(February 1, 1945) regained. , In the Japanese theater, the 
Allies faced the momentous task of invading the Japanese 
islands without, as yet, any help from the atomic bomb.
See Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1952), pp. 628-643.
l f t State Department Bulletin, Vol XII, February 18, 
1945, p. 215., and The New York Times, March 1, 1945. Also, 
Leahy, p. 320.
9Power Alliance. May it be strong and stable; may we be as
frank as possible.”"1'7
Churchill commented on his return to England: "I
know of no government which stands to its obligations, even
in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Govern- 
..18ment.
Secretary of State Stettinius regarded Yalta as
"a most successful meeting" and pointed out that there was
"every evidence...of the Russian desire to cooperate along
19all lines with the United States...."
Contrary to expectations, Stalin's promises at Yalta, 
particularly those concerning Poland, proved to be the initia­
tion of a continuing policy of misrepresentation of intentions 
rather than the panacea for postwar international problems.
In the period immediately after Yalta, the Russians were 
negligent in carrying out the terms promised for the Polish
17Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), p. 363.
TO
Ibid., p. 401.
19Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 35.
10
20
government. Free and unfettered elections as soon as possible
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, as
21
specified in Section VII of the Yalta Agreements, were not
conducted at all until January, 1947, and then they were not
22"free and unfettered."
The Soviet Union's disregard for the. terms of the
Yalta Agreements produced an immediate reaction in the United
States and Britain. On February 19, 1945, Senator Vandenberg
wrote a letter to Acting Secretary of State Grew, stating
that it had been
...asserted that...the Lublin government has 
outlawed certain elements of the Polish army 
which had been allied with the U. S. in the 
Middle East and Italy as traitors. If this 
is true in any degree it seems to me that it 
makes it simply unconscionably immoral for us 
to recognize the Lublin government.^
20Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 418.
21U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States. The 
Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 980.
22Jackson, pp. 20-22.
23Arthur H. Vandenberg (ed.), The Private Papers of 
Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952),
p. 150.
11
Churchill recognized the true Soviet Union objectives
as early as March, 1945. In a letter to Roosevelt on March 27,
1945, Churchill said that he wanted no part of permitting the
"Russian version of democracy" to be imposed on Poland or
24
any other Eastern European nation. Roosevelt responded to 
Churchill that he viewed "with anxiety and concern the develop­
ment of the Soviet attitude since.. .^ /^Yalta^ , and., .that the 
time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader
aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference 
25
to Poland)." A subsequent message from the President to
26Stalin expressed his concern in this regard. Stalin replied
on April 7, 1945, that "matters on the Polish question have
27
really reached a dead end." Almost simultaneously with the
^4Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 432.
^ I b i d . p .  435. As late as March 1, 1945, the 
President had maintained a degree of optimism regarding Big 
Three unity and the end of spheres of influence, balance of 
power, etc. See Leahy, p. 329.
26tv.,Ibid.
27
U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States, The 
Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 993.
12
exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Premier
Stalin/ Ambassador Harriman cabled Washington from Moscow,
“advocating /±n a general way/ a tough policy with Russia
as the one possible way of maintaining a soundly friendly
28
relationship with her."
As a result of the post-Yalta Polish situation 
and other issues related to the Yalta Agreements, Congress 
concluded that a change in United States policy was required.
On April 2, 1945, Mr. "Foreign Policy," Senator Vandenberg,
\
noted in his private papers, following discussions with
Secretary of State Stettinius and Senator Connally, that
There is a general disposition to stop this 
Stalin appeasement. It has to stop sometime^
Every new surrender makes it more difficult.
Later in the same month, the Senator wrote in his 
diary following another session with the Secretary of State 
that the "revolt against any further Soviet appeasement is 
growing."
oo
Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 40. On the 20th 
of April, Harriman stated essentially the same thing to 
Secretary Forrestal. See Millis, p. 47.
oq
Vandenberg, p. 161.
30Ibid., p. 165.
13
POTSDAM
Unfortunately for the cause of the United States, 
the President, who alone was aware of all the facts in the 
matter of negotiations with the Soviet Union, died a few 
days after Senators Vandenberg and Connally's anti-appease­
ment meeting with Stettinius and was succeeded by Vice 
President Harry S. Truman. With President Roosevelt's 
untimely death, White House leadership in negotiations 
with the Soviet Union was transferred to a man who initially
possessed only a limited understanding of the details of
31
the previous conferences.
As might be expected, Stalin characteristically
rose to the occasion of Roosevelt's death with the statement
that "We shall support President Truman with all our forces
32and with all our will." Stalin, the master opportunist, 
quickly reversed a previous decision to restrict Molotov 
from attending the opening session of the United Nations
^^Welles, pp. 340-341. In Welles' opinion 
President Truman possessed "neither knowledge, experience, 
nor strength" for the Presidental task of directing foreign 
policy.
32Elias M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 63.
in San Francisco, and even permitted the Foreign Minister
to visit President Truman enroute.
The new President had found the occasion to study-
recent events and had become aware of the serious breach
33
developing between the two countries. The meeting 
between Truman and Molotov did not improve matters. Truman 
reported:
...a complete deadlock had been reached on the 
subject of carrying out the Yalta agreement on 
Poland...our agreements had so far been a on ]^7 
way street and that this could not continue.
As a result of Truman's discussions with Molotov regarding
the Polish government, Molotov stated that "I have never
been talked to like that in my life." The President replied,
"Carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to 
35
like that." President Truman's official recognition of 
Soviet deceit was only the first official indication of 
a future change in United States policy. Actions were 
still many months away.
^Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, pp. 287-288.
34
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol I: Year of Decisions
(Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 77.
35Ibid., p. 82.
15
Also in April, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill
directly challenged Stalin over the question of the Polish
Government. By letter he warned Stalin that England would
not recognize a Polish Government not in accordance with
36the Yalta Agreements. The Prime Minister went even one
step furtherz he recommended to the United States that
Allied armies advance as far as possible into Germany,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia —  also contrary to previous
agreements. In this he was overruled by the American
President, and Russia proceeded to "liberate" Berlin,
37
Vienna, and Prague. In May of 1945, Churchill went on
to complain about the "iron curtain" which was descending
as the Soviet armies advanced and our own armies remained
38static in their designated zones of occupation.
As Allied anxiety regarding the "iron curtain" 
mounted, the "Big Three" met at Potsdam, Germany, in July,
3 6Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the 
Russians (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1949), p. 317.
37
Jackson, p. 10.
38Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 573.
16
1945. In place of President Roosevelt there was Truman,
accompanied by Secretary of State (newly appointed) James
F. Byrnes.; As a further complication, in the middle of
the conference Churchill had to withdraw to London to
await the outcome of a general election. Since he was
defeated and subsequently replaced by Mr. Attlee, the war-
39
time Big Three was reduced to the Big "One" —  Stalin.
Although such knotty problems as German Reparations, 
German economic unity, and the western boundary of Poland 
were discussed with some success, the question of Poland's 
government "dominated the Conference."^ Between Yalta and 
Potsdam, the United States and Britain had withdrawn recogni­
tion of the Polish exile government, and had, in faith with 
Stalin's pledge for free elections, recognized the Provi­
sional Lublin Government. But at POtsdam, there was still 
no indication that Poland had been allowed any freedom of 
action in her internal affairs, which remained dominated 
by Red Army influence. Churchill expressed concern in
39Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 296.
40Ibid., p. 299.
17
the opening sessions about Poland's plight, since it was
to save this particular country from Fascism that Britain
41
went to war in the first place. To the Prime Minister's 
question regarding elections, Stalin replied: "The Provi­
sional Government of Poland have never refused to hold free 
42elections." However, the Western Allies were convinced
otherwise, and insisted that the Potsdam Agreement reiterate
that Poland hold "free and unfettered elections...on the
43
basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot..."
While these negotiations were in progress at Potsdam,
President Truman was informed that an atomic bomb had been
44successfully tested in New Mexico. This event was to have 
major repercussions. When Churchill was likewise informed, 
it was mutually agreed that Russia was no longer required 
to fight against Japan. Stalin's reactions were twofold:
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 647.
42Ibid., p. 654.
A'i
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XIII, August 5, 
1945, p. 158.
44
Truman, I, 415-416.
18
his distrust of the Allies was increased immeasurably because
. 45he had not been informed of the project from its inception
and secondarily, now foreseeing a quick termination of the
Japanese War, he hastened his declaration of war against
Japan, in spite of the lack of enthusiasm for his action by
his allies, who had requested as a pre-requisite that Soviet
46Russia conclude an agreement with China.
In retrospect Potsdam represented the last serious 
attempt by the Big Three to amicably settle their differences. 
Thereafter, they designated their Foreign Ministers to debate 
the issues at the conference table prior to top level considera­
tion. The first such meeting was scheduled for September, 1945, 
in London. ^
MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
Between September, 1945, and July, 1946, there were 
numerous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
^^Welles, p. 346. Stalin reacted quite casually when 
President Truman informed him of the successful testing of the 
first bomb. See Deutscher, p. 547.
46Truman, I, 425. The bombing of Hiroshima occurred 
on August 6, 1945. On August 8, 1945, Russia declared war on 
Japan.
47Amelia C. Leiss (ed.), European Peace Treaties 
After World War II (World Peace Foundation, 1954), pp. 9-11.
19
primarily for the purpose of identifying the participants 
and for making ground rules which would ultimately permit 
the signing of peace treaties for the Balkan nations, Finland 
and Italy. In addition, the agenda included consideration of 
postwar government of Japan, Balkan governments, and atomic
4- 1 48energy control.
The first session was held in London. Thereafter,
the foreign ministers met at Moscow (December, 1945), London
(January, 1945) and finally in Paris (April, 1946. At all
of these conferences the United States was represented by
49
Secretary of State Byrnes.
From the beginning the meetings were a running
dispute between Byrnes and Molotov. The conflicting
interests of the two powers represented by these individuals
caused ever increasing personal bitterness between the two
50and political maneuvering at the conference tables.
^ I b i d ., pp. 11-12.
49D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917- 
1960 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 311,
337, 357-358.
50James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 92-100.
20
Byrnes' long speeches on principles meant little to the
Russians, who, according to Churchill, recognized force as
51
the only basils for bargaining. Molotov later remarked that
"he /Molotov/ wished he could find out what it was I /Byrnes/
52
wanted so we could negotiate."
Actually, the situation which Byrnes faced was most
difficult. In the first place, Allied military forces were
being de-mobilized even faster than the build-up had occurred
during the war. Within a short period of time, a relative
53Allied vacuum faced the Russian pressure in Europe. In
addition, Britain was obviously on the decline, and its
future depended on the support which the United States might
54render in the postwar world. Since her other European 
Allies were in an even worse condition than Britain, the 
United States alone suddenly faced Soviet power in Europe.
A third factor which complicated Byrnes' job was the open
51Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144-145.
52
Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 100.
53William B. Ziff, Two Worlds (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1946), p. 256. The New York Times, 
January 5, 1946, reported that the War Department was forced 
to slow down demobilization, since only 1,500,000 soldiers 
remained overseas (global).
54
Ibid., p. 265.
21
hostility of Stalin and Molotov to any American proposal.
Molotov still smarted over his encounter with the candid
American President. Stalin's distrust of his Western Allies
dated back to 1943 when he felt that Russia's very existence
depended on the timely initiation of a Second Front by England
and the United States. When this did not materialize until
1944, Stalin conjectured that possibly his allies were
intentionally delaying invasion plans to permit their two
55
ideological opponents to consume each other. In addition,
Stalin could not forget his exclusion from the development
of the atomic bomb, nor the sudden cessation of Lend-Lease
56
aid after the final victory over Japan. Finally, the 
Soviet leader found it difficult to ignore his exclusion by
the United States from active participation in matters
, . 57
pertaining to the Japanese occupation Government.
^John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since 
World War II (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, Publisher,
1960), p. 16.
56 , .
George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (4th ed.
rev.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 453.
The New York Times, January 26, 1946, reported that Russia
had asked for $6 billion in credits during the peace years
“to help reconstruct after the war."
57Redfers Opie, The Search for Peace Settlements 
(Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1951), p. 80.
22
On the other side.of the ledger there was the growing 
animosity which the United States held for Russia. The situa­
tion in Poland, which has already been reviewed, was not soon 
forgotten, even though that nation was already firmly behind 
the Iron Curtain. In addition, the. United States was 
perturbed by the methods utilized by the Soviet government 
in maintaining governments "friendly" to Soviet Russia in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, in conflict with the letter 
and spirit of the Yalta Agreements.^ Finally, there was 
the problem of Russian troops remaining in Iran after the 
war was over. Byrnes advised Stalin in December that if 
Iran brought this issue to the United Nations that the United 
States would support Iran. In January, 1946, this occurred. 
When the Secretary reacted as promised, both Stalin and 
Molotov became furious. Later, Molotov charged Byrnes
with deliberately instigating an "anti-Soviet" campaign 
59
in Iran.
For the United States in the immediate postwar 
period, Secretary Byrnes was indeed the "key" to the situation. 
In the early months after the war, Byrnes kept the affairs 
of state mainly to himself?^ however, this tendency was
58 59Leiss, p. 6. Opie, pp. 84-87.
60Welles, p. 386.
23
quickly changed by the President who recognized the value
of a foreign policy which was understood and supported by
the people and Congress. Another of Byrnes* ideosynerosies
was related to his leadership of State Department delegations
at overseas conferences. At meetings conducted with Molotov,
Byrnes often made on-the-scene decisions for the Nation.
President Truman later expressed his concern for this
usurption of Presidential authority when he said that
"More and more during the fall of 1945 I came to feel that
in his role as Secretary of State, Byrnes was beginning to
think of himself as an Assistant President in full charge
of foreign policy.”^
For his conciliatory actions at London, in December,
1945, Byrnes was criticized by members of a variety of factions.
Sumner Welles accused Byrnes of departing from
the fundamental principles established by the 
Yalta Agreements in order to appease the 
Soviet government. In a further effort at 
appeasement, we have recognized the Communist 
minority dictatorships in Yugoslavia and in 
Rumania...^2
Senator Vandenberg later remarked that he thought Byrnes 
^Truman, I, 546. ^Welles, p. 380.
24
was "loitering around Munich" in this period. On the other
hand, according to Byrnes himself, there were those in the
State Department who thought that the Secretary had been any-
64thing but conciliatory at London.
Finally, in January, 1946, the President interceded 
by personal action, with a letter to Byrnes which provided the 
"point of departure of our new policy." The last sentence
contained the essence of his thoughts for he said: "I’m
65tired of babying the Soviets."
Senator Vandenberg confirmed the new thinking in a 
speech on February 27, 1946, in which he asked the Senate 
the question, "What is Russia up to now?". The Senator 
further specified that "there is a line beyond which compro­
mise cannot go."^
63Vandenberg, p. 246.
64
Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 321. See John 
Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The MacMillan Co.,
1950), pp. 29-30.
65
Truman, I, 551-552. See also James F. Byrnes, 
"Byrnes Answers Truman", Collier's, April 8, 1952. The former 
Secretary of State denies that the alleged letter by President 
Truman "was either read to me or sent to me." The issue of 
the existence of the letter apparently has never been fully 
resolved.
^Vandenberg, pp. 246-249.
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In July-August, 1946, the Paris Peace Conference 
categorically convinced Secretary Byrnes of the fallacy of 
. trusting the Russians in negotiations. Afterwards, Byrnes 
stated
...I should be less than frank if I did not 
confess, my bewilderment at the motives which 
the Soviet Delegation attributed to the United 
States at Paris... They charged that the United 
States...was now seeking to enslave Europe
economically.^7
Even though peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Hungary, and Finland were signed in February,
681947, Byrnes had already resigned two weeks before, 
and was replaced by George C. Marshall.
THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD IN RETROSPECT
There has been much speculation in the past twenty 
years that the United States was "sold out" at. Yalta. Yet 
in retrospect, when the United States' concessions to Soviet 
Russia are measured against her military requirement for 
Soviet participation in the Far.East theater of operations, 
they become more reasonable. In Europe the situation
^Zacharias, p. 72. ^Leiss, p. 15.
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emerging from Yalta was more immediately of grave concern 
to the Western Allies, as the Soviet leaders neglected to 
abide by Big Three sanctioned agreements, most distinctly 
in the case of Poland.
After Potsdam, the de facto military situation in 
Eastern Europe precluded any earnest endeavors by the United
States and Britain to force Russian compliance with the Yalta
69 •
Agreements, for by calculation Stalin maintained large
military forces in Europe for the purpose of extending
Communist influence. On the other hand, Britain and the
United States rationalized that agreements with Russia would
indeed be binding and as such, adequate for the security of
Europe. Consequently, military forces in Europe other than
those for constabulary and occupation duties were essentially
disbanded and returned to the parent nations en masse. This
disregard for the military balance of power in Europe would
lead to some rather emphatic reversals of policy within a
short period of time. Fortunately for the Allies, Russia's
staggering war losses, both in industrial capability and
manpower, limited to a degree a timely and more aggressive
69W. W. Rostrow, The United States in the World Arena 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 177.
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policy in Europe; otherwise, not only Poland, Austria,
Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia would have become
Communist, but possibly West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
70
L u x e m b u r g ,  France, and Italy as well.
By early 1947, Russian designs on western Europe had 
become clear enough for the United States to recognize that 
a major policy change was not only in order, but absolutely 
essential.
70Deutscher, p. 532.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE U. S. POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
A new policy was first suggested by the United States
Charge d* Affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, who cabled
his recommendations to Washington in February, 1946. In
July of the following year, essentially the same information
appeared in Foreign Affairs Magazine, anonymously authored
by Mr. "X". Ambassador Kennan*s analysis indicated that
United States foreign policy required reshaping along lines
to counter Soviet ''expansive tendencies" wherever they might
1
occur on the Soviet periphery.
As Secretary of State Acheson later remarked, the 
object of the containment policy was, and is, to build 
situations of strength in opposition to Soviet thrusts
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 107-124 for the text of Kennan‘s 
article in Foreign Affairs Magazine. See also James Burnham, 
Containment or Liberation (New York: The John Day Co., 1952),
p. 20. Also, Rostow, p. 199. Also, J. F. Dulles, War or 
Peace, pp. 29-30. Dulles says that containment is a "no 
appeasement" policy and that Secretary Byrnes initiated it in 
September 1945. However, the first reference to the policy 
as a national objective is contained in Mr. Kennan's cable 
to Washington.
2towards political and/or military vacuums. If the new 
policy proved successful, it would promote tendencies 
which must eventually find their outlet in either the 
break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.^
Containing Communism on a near global scale promised 
to be no mean assignment for the United States and its 
Allies. Ambassador Kennan's definition of containment 
specifically warned of the long term requirements of the 
new policy. In this regard, implementation of such a 
policy would require not only free nations on the periphery 
with stable governments and sound economies, but in addition, 
would require the necessary military forces within the 
territorial confines of the peripheral nations to thwart 
communist aggression from its inception and prevent further 
losses in the balance of power. Such Allied military 
counter-actions would be required on a quick reaction basis - 
there would be no time available to call up and train the 
reserves.
2State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, March 20, 1950
p. 427.
3Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 124.
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How the United States faced the total threat posed 
by the Soviet Union on all fronts and how she assisted in 
the reestablishment of economically stable governments on 
the Russian periphery will be further discussed.
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
The first of many confrontations between the United 
States and Russia which called for the application of the 
policy of containment occurred in early 1947 in Greece 
and Turkey. More precisely, it was the first encounter 
between the two world giants wherein the Soviet position
4
was not directly enhanced and guaranteed by the Red Army; 
as such it was indeed the first situation which was really 
contestable at all.
The trouble within Greece was precipitated by 
Communist guerilla actions emanating from and supported 
through Yugoslavia. A Communist take over appeared likely.
4Spanier, p. 19. Secretary Marshall, in Moscow in 
early 1947, later said..."I was being pressed constantly... 
to give the Russians hell...At that time, the facilities for 
giving them hell...was 1-1/3 divisions over the entire U.S. 
That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with 
over 260...". See John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel 
Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 282.
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Similarly, in Turkey apprehension mounted as Communists 
applied diplomatic pressure and threatened the use of
i
5military force. On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador
submitted two communiques to the United States Which declared
that the British economy could not continue to provide aid
to either Greece or Turkey and that within weeks British
military support must be terminated. On a priority basis,
the State Department analyzed the problem facing Greece and
Turkey and obtained the concurrence of President Truman that
American economic and military aid constituted the best
6
possible solution. On the 12th of March, 1947, the admini­
stration’s plans for the assistance program for Greece and 
Turkey had progressed sufficiently for the President to 
present specific details to a joint session of Congress.
The President said
I believe that it must be the policy of 
the United States to support free people who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressures...The assistance that I
5
Rostow, p. 207.
^Alexander de Conde, ’’George Catlett Marshall, " An 
Uncertain Tradition, (ed.) Norman A. Graebner (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 251.
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am recommending for Greece and Turkey /?400,000,0007 
amounts to little more than one-tenth of one percent 
of.../the wartime investment of $341,000,000,000/. ^
For Congress in 1947 the bill which would implement
the Truman Doctrine was somewhat difficult to accept without
considerable deliberation prior to passage. A protracted
debate ensued on the floors of Congress, in which it was
asserted by Senator Vandenberg that the United Nations had
been created specifically to maintain the peace and that
consequently American assistance to Greece and Turkey should
be administered under the auspices of the United Nations.
Others saw Greece and Turkey as clearly beyond the area
where the United States should directly intervene? on the
contrary, they argued that the eastern Mediterranean area
was and should remain primarily a British concern. Others
debated that intervention in Greece and Turkey could lead
to further involvement in the form of dangerous confronta-
8
tions directly with Soviet Russia.
Proponents of the legislation argued simply and 
effectively that Greece and Turkey would become Communist
7
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XVI, March 23, 1947, 
pp. 536-537.
8Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power, 
1898-1954 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1954),
p. 232.
33
if Congress failed to act favorably on the assistance act.
Ultimately, the act passed Congress on May 22, 1947, after
a vote of 287 to 107 in the House and 67 to 28 in the Senate.
The State Department proceeded to reach agreements with Greece
and Turkey in June and July of 1947, thereby consummating
America's first positive action toward containing Communism
9
in Southern Europe and the Middle East.
THE MARSHALL PLAN
While the Truman Doctrine promised to secure the
10
"southern flank of Europe," it did not directly address 
itself to the postwar problems of Western Europe. Since a 
small number of American troops remained in that area, the 
threat of direct Soviet intervention was rather distant, 
obviously because the small contingent could be reinforced 
if required. On the other hand, economic problems Were 
probably just as acute in Europe as in Greece and Turkey.
9
William Reitzel et al. United States Foreign Policy, 
1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1956), p. 116.
See also F. R. Dulles, p. 232.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden 
City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 80.
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The items needed to recover from the devastations of four 
years of war, such as "wheat, cotton, sulphur, machinery, 
trucks, and coat," were available only in the United States.^ 
This shortage of raw materials in turn created a shortage in 
export produce? hence there were few American dollars coming 
into Europe. Thus, a dollar gap existed which propelled 
European economies headlong toward the precipice of complete 
collapse.
Even before 1947, the United States had recognized
the serious economic situation in Western Europe. In
December, 1945, at the termination of Lend-Lease aid, a
loan of $3,750,000,000 had been extended to Britain in an
effort to maintain the stability of the pound. A similar
loan of $1,200,000,000 was made to France, and before the
end of 1946, a total of $7,500,000,000 in loans was extended
13
to Western Europe. This financial assistance proved
insufficient to maintain solvency. By 1947, the economic
crisis had permitted political gains by the Communist parties
in France and Italy, and by early 1948 had exhausted the
14
$3,750,000,000 loan to Britain.
11Spanier/ p. 39 12Ibid.
^Rostow, pp. 197-198 ^The New York Times, March 4, 1948
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Whereas there had been some opposition in Congress
to American assistance rendered previously to Greece and
Turkey because the area was so far afield, few Congressmen
contested the requirement for United States assistance in
Europe to maintain a favorable balance of power in so vital
an area. The consequences to the United States of a Communist
Europe were clear to most government officials? hence even
by 1947 Europe was recognized as America's first line of
15
defense in a contest or possible war with Russia.
Into the middle of Europe's economic problems
stepped the new Secretary; of State, George C. Marshall, who
was recalled from China to replace James F. Byrnes, effective
onJanuary 8, 1947. In April, Marshall created within the
State Department a new super planning division which he
called the "Policy Planning Staff." Headed by Mr. "X,”
George F. Kennan, the policy planning staff Was initially
directed to devise an overall plan for the reconstruction
16
of Western Europe. The resultant plan, which called for a 
large economic aid program for Europe, was completed on 
May 23, 1947, and introduced by Secretary Marshall in a
15 1 ftSpanier, p. 40 Rostow, pp. 209-210.
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speech at Harvard's Graduation Exercise on June 5, 1947.
In his address, Secretary Marshall said
The breakdown of the business structure of 
Europe during the war was complete... she must 
have substantial additional help or face 
economic, social, and political deterioration 
of a very grave character...The initiative, I 
think, must come from Europe. ^
The Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program 
as it was officially designated, was developed in detail 
during the second half of 1947. Under this plan United 
States officials asked seventeen European states to present 
a "plan for their common needs and common recovery."^
With the consent of the other participating members, Great 
Britain shaped the joint recovery plan and the request to 
the United States.19
The State Department originally estimated that the 
four-year costs of the European Recovery Program would 
approach $22,000,000,000; however, in the course of debates
Instate Department Bulletin, Vol. XVI, June 15, 1947, 
pp. 1159-1160.
l8Ibid.
19Rostow, p. 213. Participating members formed the 
Organization of European Economic Cooperation, which became 
the instrument for application of American assistance.
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and refinements in the Congress, the figure was reduced to
$17,000,000,000 and in actuality between 1948 and 19 52,
20only $12,000,000,000 in aid was delivered.
Although the final and complete European Recovery
Program did not pass Congress until April 1948, an Interim
Aid Plan for France, Italy, and Austria was submitted to
21
Congress in November, 1947, and received quick passage.
John Foster Dulles was in France at the time the Interim Aid
Plan was under consideration by Congress, and he related how
Communist strikes had disrupted rail communication, paralyzed
industry, and interrupted the supply of electric power and
water in Paris. He recorded that the strikes subsided in
December as France regained hope and confidence with the
22promise of economic aid from the United States. The
Foreign Aid Act of 1947, as the Interim Plan was officially
designated, in authorizing $597,000,000 in aid, stated that
It is the purpose of this Act to provide immediate 
aid urgently needed by the peoples of Austria,
^"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950," 
The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951. Paul 
Hoffman, Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration 
estimated the 4% year ERP Program costs at $17,000,000,000. 
See Appendix A for a summary of foreign aid (and military aid) 
for the period 1946-1955.
21
J. F. Dulles, pp. 106-108.
China, France, and Italy...to alleviate conditions
of hunger and cold and prevent serious economic
retrogression.^
America's economic plans for European recovery took
the initiative from the Soviet bloc. Soviet satellite nations
in eastern Europe initially reacted favorably to overtures for
their participation, since their economic situation was similar
to that within western European nations. However, within the
Kremlin there was consternation concerning the ultimate effects
of such cooperation with Capitalism on the part of Soviet
satellite nations. Fearing that he might lose some of his
tight control over the nations, Stalin disapproved their*
24participation m  the European Recovery Program. In Moscow, 
Ambassador Walter B. Smith reported that the Soviet Union 
publicly criticized economic assistance plans of the United 
States as a "cunning way of subjecting all Europe to American 
capital.
The plan proved to be not only a significant political 
maneuver in that it provided a degree of unification among
23U. S., Congress, Foreign Aid Act of 1947, Public 
Law 389, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, Sec. 2.
24
Rostow, p. 212. The subsequent quasi-defection 
of Yugoslavia and the revolt in Hungary proved that Staliri's 
concern was well-founded.
25Walter B. Smith, My Three Years in Moscow 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950), pp. 172-173.
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Western European nations vis-a-vis Communism, but of even 
more importance, it proved successful in its economic mission*
By 1950 European production exceeded production figures for
26 271939 by twenty-five percent, by 1951, forty percent.
The massive success enjoyed in Europe even had the side
effect of creating a boom in the United States, since
European dollars became available for the purchase of
28American products.
AID PROGRAMS IN RETROSPECT
As the Truman Doctrine contained Communism in Greece
and Turkey, so did the European Recovery Program contribute
to its containment in Europe. Ambassador Smith said that
"The Marshall Plan...has been the major force in the
29
stabilization of Europe..." The two plans clearly mark a
turning point in American-Soviet relations in that they
actively initiated the Cold War for the Allies, opened the
30door for the Point Four assistance program, and finally
26 27Spanier, p. 43. Rostow, p. 216.
28 oq
Spanier, p. 43. Smith, p. 332.
30The Point Four program provided technical assistance 
for undeveloped nations. It was called "Point Four" because 
it was the fourth point mentioned in the Presidential address 
of January 20, 1949, which introduced it. See Rostow, p. 256.
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precipitated the next step in containing Communism, a 
collective security defense pact.
THE BERLIN BLOCKADE
The European Recovery Program certainly did not ease
the tensions which had developed between the United States
* and the Soviet Union since 1945, nor was it designed to do
so. The resultant Soviet boycott of and resentment to the
plan did, however, add a new subject for tirades from
F. M. Molotov and the Soviet foreign office. Concurrent
with the propoganda emanating from Moscow was a continued
Communist effort to bring under Soviet Control additional
European nations. Efforts to expand Soviet influence proved
successful in Czechoslovakia, When a successful Communist
Party coup d ’etat established Soviet domination and Communist
31
control in February, 1948.
The apprehension which had been mounting among the 
remaining free European nations now reached the acute state 
as they realized that military unity would be required to
31** M. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe: A History
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 374.
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complement American economic assistance. In early 1948
England and France were formally allied under the terms of
the Dunkirk Pact. In March, 1948, this alliance was expanded
to include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemberg, and was
called the Brussels Pact. At the same time there was
serious thought and discussion by the National Security
Council of bringing the United States into a military
32
alliance with the Brussels Pact nations.
These open manifestations by the European community
to stop Communism, overtly if necessary, caused Stalin deep
concern as did the spectre of a resurgent Germany. When
Secretary Byrnes, at Stuttgart, Germany, in 1946, stated
that "the German people..., under proper safeguards, should
now be given primary responsibility for the running of their 
33
own affairs," it became clear that the United States and 
Soviet Russia had vastly different ideas as to the future 
of Germany. In addition to Byrnes' proposal to transfer a
32"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950," 
The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951. The 
idea had been introduced as early as March, 1946, in the 
W. S. Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. 
See also F. R. Dulles, p. 241.
33
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XV, September 15, 
1946, p. 499. The first step towards economic revival in 
Germany consisted of General Clay's action in May, 1946, of 
terminating reparation deliveries from the American Zone of 
Germany. See Rostow, p. 191.
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degree of self-control.to the Germans, between 1946 and 1948
the United States and her Allies became staunch supporters
of German economic unification. This concept also was
opposed by Russia who sought to maintain the status quo of
34
separate zones. As the Brussels Pact alliance evolved, 
the issue of Germany took on more and more importance, not 
only because of Germany's previous roles as chief antagonist 
in the two World Wars, but now, and more importantly, because 
she was enmeshed between Communism and the free world in the 
area which held the industrial balance of power — the heart 
of industrial Europe. Thus by 1948, Germany, which only 
three years before had been the instrument Of unity between 
the United States and Soviet Russia now had become, in the 
words of Bernard Baruch, the "focus of their disunity."^
Secretary Marshall's State Department deputy, Dean 
Acheson, later summarized the events relating to Germany in 
1948 by saying that the Soviets clearly were seeking "virtual 
control over German economic and political life." The 
"resultant paralysis" in Germany would obviously hinder the
 ^^Ro s tow, p . 193.
35
Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 409.
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overall European Recovery Plan which needed German resources
36
and industrial strength. The only recourse open to the 
Allies appeared to be a complete economic unification of 
the three zones occupied by the United States, England, and 
France. By agreement in London, in June, 1948, this unifi­
cation became a reality, with the added proviso that Germany 
would be authorized a provisional government exclusive of
the zone occupied by the Soviets but including the allied-
37controlled areas in Berlin, deep inside the Soviet Zone. 
Concurrent with the new economic and political reorganiza­
tion of Germany was a currency r eform. The purpose of
this action was to free the newly unified area financially
38from the inflated currency of the old Reichsmark.
Ambassador Smith in Moscow reported that the Allied 
moves towards unification and revival of Germany were consid­
ered by Stalin as a direct challenge to Soviet Union
36
McGeorge Bundy (ed.), Pattern of Responsibility 
(Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), pp. 103-104.
See State Department Bulletin, Vol. XX, p. 586, for the 
text of Mr. Acheson's speech.
37
Ibid. 2,500,000 Germans lived on the “island" of 
Berlin. See J. F. Dulles, pp. 54-56. See Appendix B, a map 
of the zones of Germany.
44
39interests in Europe. On June 24/ 1948, from Moscow came the
order to retaliate with a land and rail blockade of the allied
access route to Berlin, virtually isolating the 2,500,000
Berliners on their island within a sea under Communist control.
From the initiation, Stalin hoped to trade a delay of the
formation of the new West German government as the price
for termination of the blockade. If this trade proved
unacceptable to the Allies, the alternative, as he saw it,
41was an allied withdrawal from Berlin.
The United States avoided these alternatives by 
choosing a third alternative, one probably unexpected by the
Germany and Europe into .Berlin, called “Operation Vittles"
by the American pilots who flew their C-47 and C-54 cargo
42aircraft over the land blockade.
On June 26, 1948, the massive airlift began, with
planes eventually attaining a landing interval of as close
39Smith, p. 230. Smith and Molotov had discussed the 
overall situation in Europe at some length in May, 1948, with­
out effectively relaxing tensions. See Smith, pp. 159-164.
40Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 365.
41
Smith, pp. 252-253.
42Clay, pp. 367-381. Also W. Phillips Davison, The
Berlin Blockade (Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 105-107.
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as one every three minutes and delivering payloads of from
434,000 tons to almost 13,000 tons per day.
Reaction to the blockade was rather slow in coming.
Not until October did the item appear on the United Nations
Security Council agenda; that agency proceeded to study the
44
problem during the winter of 1948-1949. The next Soviet 
move occurred on December 1, 1948, when a separate Communist
city government was installed in the Soviet Sector of
45Berlin.
Some 321 days later, the efforts of the American 
Air Force had proven that free Berliners could survive on 
goods delivered by air supply lines only. The airlift had
successfully weathered the winter fogs at the Berlin aero-
46dromes. American prestige in Germany was vastly enhanced
as a result of the tremendous effort on the part of our
airmen in delivering vitally-needed food and coal for 
47
survival. An allied counter-blockade of East Germany
43Clay, p. 381. Eventually, a total of 1,592,787 
tons of supplies were moved in to Berlin. See Smith, p. 231.
44
J. F. Dulles, pp. 56-57,
45The New York Times, December 1, 1948.
46 , 47
Ibid. J. F. Dulles, p. 58.
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had proven more effective than the Berlin Blockade. 
Consequently, Stalin decided to pick a time and place
48
suitable to the Soviet cause and terminate the blockade.
Thus, on the 12th of May, 1949, the blockade ended
49on terms advantageous to the United States and West Germany.
This overt action on the part of the United States 
in meeting Soviet aggressive tendencies in Germany demon­
strated the effectiveness of the containment policy when 
backed with determination and resources.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
As Secretary Marshall had related in Moscow in
early 1947, it was quite difficult to negotiate with the
Soviets when backed by only 20,000 troops as opposed to over
502,500,000 on their side. Secretary Byrnes had also been
48Smith, p. 257. After Stalin mentioned that the 
Berlin situation might be "solvable," subsequent discussions 
with Mr. Malik led to the actual termination agreement. See 
J. F. Dulles, p. 58.
49Ibid.
50
Sparrow, p. 282. Actually, a fraction over one United 
States Army division faced over 260 Russian divisions. See 
Hanson W. Baldwin, The Great Arms Race (New York: Frederick
A.‘ Praeger, Publishers, 1958), p. 36, for a comparison of the 
fire power of American and Soviet army divisions. In December 
1946, the Air Force had only two combat air wings to comple­
ment the Army divisions. See Rostow, p. 172.
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faced with the same problem in his dealings with Molotov and
later remarked that "He /Truman/ announced the policy of
containing Russia.. ./put/ failed to provide any divisions to
51support such a policy."
The search for an improved military posture which 
would transform Allied forces from their weakened, demobi­
lized condition into a credible deterrence was a two-pronged 
effort. The American monopoly on the atomic bomb and the 
means to deliver it were exploited with an almost immediate
increase to eleven combat-ready wings within the Air Force 
52
by mid-19.47. The National Security Act of July 1947
provided for a major reorganization of the national military
structure. This act, the so-called Unification Act, in
actuality created a third service, the Air Force, which was
elevated to equality with the Army and the Navy. New agencies
formed included the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources 
53Board. In short, the new reorganization promised improved
51
James F. Byrnes, "Byrnes Answers Truman," Collier's, 
April 26, 1956.
52Rostow, p. 172.
53
Rostow, p. 174. The National Security Council was 
created with the purpose in mind of coordinating military and 
foreign policy. Although initially dominated by military 
representation (all three service secretaries plus the Secretary 
of Defense), eventually the three service representatives were 
dropped. See Graebner, p. 260.
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efficiency and coordination for the formation of national 
policy as well as the application of national force if 
required.
The second of the two-pronged effort to enhance the
military posture of the United States vis-a-vis Soviet
Russia was aimed directly at the area where Soviet aggression
tendencies were prevalent and where already the Interim Aid
Bill and the European Recovery Plan had sought to stave off
aggression through economic means. Russian opposition to
the Interim Aid Bill, the excessive use of the veto in the
United Nations Security Council, the stalemate at the
London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1947,
and the fall of Czechoslovakia in January, 1948, convinced
Secretary Marshall and other national leaders of the
necessity to-complement the European aid programs with
54
active military protection.
Although discussions and thought at the time empha­
sized the military defensive alliance as the prime function 
of the future organization, other obvious benefits from such 
an alliance were not excluded. For example, it was 
recognized that the unity provided by a mutual defense pact
54Graebner, p. 261.
49
Would provide considerable advantages in political negotia-
55
tions with Soviet Russia.
The formation of the Brussels Pact in March, 1948, 
provided the vehicle through which expansion could be 
accomplished to include the North American nations of 
Canada and the United States. The suggestion by Canadian 
Prime Minister St. Laurent in April, 1948, for such inclu­
sion, ^  provided the concept with the necessary momentum.
The United States Senate, spurred on by the initiation of 
the Berlin Blockade in June, passed a resolution introduced 
by Senator Vandenberg in mid-June, 1948, which basically 
agreed in advance to United States* "association...with 
such regional and other collective arrangements as are
based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual 
57aid..." The Vandenberg Resolution thus paved the way
58for preliminary negotiations in July, 1948, in Washington.
55
Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance
(The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 32-33.
56
Ibid.
57State Department Bulletin, Vol. IX, July 18, 1949,
p. 79.
58
Osgood, p. 33. Bailey, p. 808, points out that 
the Senate Resolution broke the long-standing U. S. policy 
of maintaining no entangling alliances in Europe.
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In the preliminary planning stage, there were some
who considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as
a sort of a Kellogg-Briant Pact for western nations wherein
if any of its members were attacked, the remaining members
would respond with military force against the aggression.
Dean Acheson of the State Department said that
What is required /Tn lieu of brute force stoppage7
is rather sufficient strength to make it impossible
for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy
victory... The fundamental pledge of the treaty,
that an attack on one signatory will mean an
attack on all, closes the door to piecemeal 
59aggression. ^
The "guaranty pact" concept created considerable
apprehension in the forward area where about twelve scattered
divisions faced twenty-five fully armed and, more importantly,
60
fully coordinated Soviet divisions. French Premier
H. Queuille predicted that any recurrence of invasion such
as those of the two previous world wars would leave France
only a corpse and not worth recovery. Consequently, he
emphasized that the American line of defense in Europe must
61be considered the existing Soviet border.
59 State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXI, August 8, 1949, 
p. 193. George F. Kennan concurred in this "guaranty pact" 
concept. See Osgood, pp. 33-35.
^Osgood, pp. 28-29.
61The New York Times, March 3, 1949, p. 5.
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In accordance with French desires, a "forward 
strategy" was finally adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization with the concurrence of the United States.
Military planners foresaw a requirement for something on 
the order of eighty to eighty-five divisions of ground
6 2forces with two-thirds of these to be immediately available.
Such a ground force would serve two purposes: (1) Act as a
"trip wire" in which initial contact in an invasion would
directly involve a clash with American nationals and hence
assure full United States retaliation, (2) Actually hold the
Red Army at the Elbe River until the full force of American
63
airpower could be applied.
Although there was never much doubt regarding the 
approval by the Brussels Pact nations of the broader treaty, 
since the inclusion of the United States inspired considerable 
confidence in Western Europe, prospective members were
62
Osgood, p. 34-38.
63
Spanier, p. 50. European members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, particularly Great Britain, graciously 
permitted the use of their aerodromes for the American Air 
Force's deployment of atomic bombers in support of the second 
purpose. For a discussion of the "trip-wire" concept, see 
Glenn H. Snyder Deterrence and Defense (Princeton University 
Press, 1961), pp. 130-131. See map, Appendix C, for a graphical 
display of treaty members.
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"advised” to join the new North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
64tion if they expected any military aid from the United States.
On April 4, 1949, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France#
Great Britian, Iceland, Italy, Luxemberg, the Netherlands
Norway, Portugal, and the United States signed the treaty
65which formed the new organization. As approved, the treaty 
guaranteed military assistance from all members in the event 
of an attack on one of its members. Even more important 
was the fact that it specified that a joint military staff 
be formed to assure unified actions for forces commited to 
mutual support. In addition, its format, as presented to 
Congress, authorized the President to use American forces 
as required in support of the mutual defense agreement.
In spite of these far-reaching, and on. the whole, quite
revolutionary provisions, public debate on the treaty in
6 6the United States fell far short of expectancies. Dean 
Acheson had little difficulty maneuvering the treaty through
64The New York Times, January 15, 1949, p. 1.
65State Department Bulletin, Vol. XX, April 17, 1949,
pp. 471-482.
^ The New York Times. May 19, 1949. Initially, 
there was no direct commitment of American ground forces autho­
rized for integration with North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
forces. However, this integration did occur in 1951 and 1952.
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the Senate which had previously agreed to the principle in
advance. The Senate approved the measure on July 21, 1949,
67by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen.
Brussels Pact nations were so confident that the 
Senate would approve the treaty that on April 5, 1949/ the 
day after the signing, but well in advance of Senate approval, 
they delivered a request to the United States for military 
assistance to put teeth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
zation Pact.
Their request stated that
In order to carry out a common defence 
programme...there is an urgent need for 
United States material and financial 
assistance.
In response to this request, on the same day that 
he signed the treaty implementing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, President Truman presented a bill to Congress 
authorizing military assistance to countries included in the 
new organization. As approved in October, 1949, this bill
67
F. R. Dulles, p. 244.
68John Gange, American Foreign Relations (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1959), pp. 122-123. Although the 
quotation is from paragraph 5 of the request from the Brussels 
Pact nations, the words deleted refer to the previous portion 
of the request, which enumerated the principles upon which 
further negotiations should proceed.
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authorized expenditures "not to exceed $500,000,000" but
69
with another $500,000,000 available on a standby basis.
Thus, the loop in Europe was completed. Economic
aid had been provided. A viable military organization
supported by American atomic bombers had come into being,
and finally, military assistance had been authorized by
the Congress for European allies. A feeling of complacency
set in temporarily in the United States only to be shattered
for the long term by the Soviet detonation of an atomic
device in 1949 and for the short term by the Korean War
70which commenced in 1950.
THE KOREAN WAR
The long term destabilizing event, the Soviet
atomic bomb, could be met only by increasing the potency of
the United States' strategic deterrence. President Truman's
approval for the production of a hydrogen bomb in January,
1950, and the build-up of the Strategic Air Command assured
at least a temporary advantage over the Soviet Union in 
71
this regard.
69U. S. Congress, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 
1949, Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Sec. 102 
and 103.
70 71
Osgood, pp. 50-51. Rostow, p. 233.
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The successful economic revival of Western Europe, 
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
the resurgence of Germany, the successful airlift into
72Berlin, and finally, the implementation of the Schumann Plan
all contributed to the Soviet stratagem of a transference of
expansive tendencies from Western Europe to the Far East.
Stymied by allied strength in Europe, the Soviet Union turned
elsewhere to a geographical location where the balance of
73power was in her favor. Such a situation had been created
by the withdrawal in June, 1949, of 50,000 American occupation
74troops from the area of Korea south of the 38th parallel.
The surprise and unprovoked attack on South Korea
75occurred before dawn on June 24, 1950. The stunned 
Republic of Korea defenders, supported only by a handful
72The Schumann Plan of May 1950 sought "increased 
productivity in the European steel and coal industries." It 
also bound France and Germany together in ways which would 
minimize the possibilities of future friction and conflict."
See Rostow, p. 218.
73
Spanier, p. 67.
74
"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950," 
Congressional Digest, Volume 30, January to December, 1951.
75
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol II: Years of Trial
and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 332.
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of American military advisers, reeled southward from the 
effects of the North Korean artillery barrages and troop 
assaults.76
President Truman, enroute from Washington to Kansas 
City at the time of the attack, kept abreast of the situation 
by telephone with the new Secretary of State Acheson and the 
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk. The 
gravity of the situation as reported from Korea caused the 
President to return to Washington the following day. John 
Foster Dulles, who only a few days before had returned from 
a visit to South Korea, cabled Washington from Tokyo as 
follows:
...to sit by while Korea is over-run by an 
unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous 
chain of events leading most probably to world 
war.77
Unquestionably, the Korean invasion constituted the 
severest test thus far of the containment policy. Secretary 
Acheson had committed the United States to the defense of 
free Asia on general security grounds and had specifically 
warned the Chinese against "aggressive or subversive
7ft !
Ibid., pp. 333-334.
77
Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Why We Went
to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951.
7ftadventures beyond their borders." However, earlier in
the year, Secretary Acheson, in discussing the situation
in the Far East, had specifically excluded South Korea as
7ftan area to be protected by the United States. Thus, based 
on State Department papers, the President could have justi­
fiably chosen to withdraw entirely from Korea or to stand 
and fight the aggressor.
By Monday, June 26th, it had become clear the attack 
was in fact an all-out invasion and that the Republic of 
South Korea could not survive without external assistance. 
With the support of a Security Council resolution to the 
effect that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace, 
President Truman declared to his staff on the 26th of June 
that
What was developing in Korea seemed to me 
like a repetition on a larger scale of what 
had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing 
for weakness in our armory we had to meet their 
thrust without getting embroiled in a world­
wide war.®®'
7ft
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, March 27, 1950 
pp. 467-472. The speech was delivered in San Francisco, Calif 
on March 15, 1950.
79State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, January 23, 
1950, p. 116. The speech by the Secretary of State was made 
before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., on 
January 12, 1950.
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On the evening of the 26th of June, instructions 
were passed to General Douglas MacArthur to send all avail­
able ammunition which could be spared to the South Korean 
army and, in addition, to furnish ships and planes for the 
protection and evacuation of American dependents.- This latter 
requirement was naturally interpreted very liberally by the 
General, who from the initiation of the first attack, advocated 
direct American assistance. The same directive from Washington 
started the Seventh Fleet north from the Philippines to take 
up station in the Straits of Formosa for the purpose of
completely neutralizing Formosa and thereby preventing a
81
widening of the conflict.
By Wednesday, the 28th of June, the military situation
in Korea had further deteriorated to the point that General
MacArthur called the Pentagon advocating direct commitment
of two American divisions. With the approval by Washington
of MacArthur1s plea for general force commitment under the
United Nations banner and the immediate authorization of a
82
naval blockade of North Korea, the policy of containment con­
currently became fully implemented in the Far East and passed
O 1
Ibid., pp. 334-335.
Q p
Ibid., p. 343.
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from the passive to the active.
Although forced back by August into a small perimeter 
around the port of Pusan on the south tip of the Korean penin­
sula, General MacArthur on September 15th executed a "brilliant
maneuver," an invasion from the sea at Inchon, behind enemy 
83lines. This maneuver turned the tide against the North
Koreans who by September 30th had hastily retreated north
84
to the 38th Parallel.
At this point in the war a further major policy 
decision was in order: should United Nations' forces pursue
the war into North Korea with the aim of unifying all Korea 
or was a standstill in order at the 38th Parallel, from 
whence the initial attack came? The National Security 
Council recommended the unification of all Korea and the 
destruction of the army of North Korea, provided "there was 
no indication of threat of entry of Sovde t or Chinese
Q C
Communists elements in force..." With the approval of 
the President and with the support of the United Nations, 
the forces of General MacArthur successfully moved into
83
Truman, II, 360. The President so stated in a 
message of congratulations to General MacArthur.
84 ft s
Rostow, p. 236. Truman, II, p. 359.
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North Korea and approached the Yalu River by November,
1950.
contrary to the national intelligence estimate,
however, in late November Red Chinese forces streamed into
North Korea from Manchurian bases, and the Korean War
suddenly took a turn for the worse. Secretary Acheson
remarked that
...This is not merely another phase of the 
Korean campaign. This is a fresh and unprovoked 
aggressive act, even more immoral than the first.
By March of 1951 the see-saw affair was back again where
it all started, and in April General MacArthur was removed
by the President for publicly advocating direct involvement
87with Red China. In the process of reaching a decision to
remove his subordinate, the Commander-in-Chief reasoned that
...our Constitution embodies the principle of 
civilian control of the military. This was the 
principle that General MacArthur threatened...
It was my duty to act.^®
The war then took on a stalemate condition at the 38th
89Parallel which lasted through the truce negotiation phase, 
and in fact the 38th Parallel ultimately became the line
86
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, p. 963.
87
Truman, II, pp. 442-449.
^ I b i d ., p. 445. ^Rostow, p. 236.
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of demarcation in Korea or the so-called Bamboo Curtain.
In retrospect there are several aspects of
historical importance of the Korean War which need to be
highlighted. First, the invasion was obviously specifically
designed to exploit a position of weakness, a position
created by the previous year's withdrawl of American troops
and additionally by the general de-emphasis within the
Department of Defense of the importance of Army ground
troops. This latter concept envisioned a heavy reliance
90oh American atomic bombers to maintain the peace.
However, the United States chose not to utilize h.er 
bombers in their designed mission as atomic bomb carriers. 
Instead, the American atomic bombers were used only in the 
more conventional role of dropping high explosive bombs, 
and Communist forces chose not to employ heavy bombers at 
all. From this it may be concluded that both the Communists 
and the United States felt either that the atomic bomb was 
not required in Korea, or that its use would result in 
retaliatory strikes by the opposition, or that its use 
was immoral and might bring world censure.
90Ibid., pp. 228-230.
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Finally, the American response, even though involv­
ing less than full scale commitment of weapons, and even 
though by the final settlement achieving only a stalemate 
or status quo ante bellum, did represent a clear statement 
and resolve by the United States to stop Communist aggression 
in the Far East. Secretary Acheson summarized the situation 
as follows:
In Korea the Russians presented a check which 
was drawn on the bank account of collective 
security /containment in disguise/. The 
Russians thought the check would bounce. They 
thought it was a bad check. But to their sur­
prise, the teller paid it.^
Short term though.the Korean War may be considered, 
it also had several important long terms results which 
affected not only the Far East but the entire position of 
the free world vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. Success within the 
United Nations Security Council during the crisis months of 
June and July, 1950, was directly attributable to the 
absence of the Soviet delegate and his veto power. However, 
his return in August clouded the future in regards to United 
Nations responses in any future situation similar to the 
Korean War. Consequently orr September 20, 1950, Secretary
91State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXV, June 29, 1951,
p. 125.
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Acheson presented United States recommendations "designed
to increase the effectiveness of United Nations action
92against aggression." The Acheson Plan, as this was later
named, provided that if the Security Council failed to take
action to maintain international peace and security by
virtue of a veto, the General Assembly would "consider
the matter and make recommendations to members for collective
93measures, including force if necessary."
In June 1950, Congress authorized $5,000,000,000 
for the defense of Europe.94 In 1951 Greece and Turkey 
join .ed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military 
forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were 
reinforced in 19 51 and 1952 by the direct commitment of 
American divisions, as General Eisenhower, recalled from 
Columbia University by President Truman as the first supreme 
commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, sought 
to strengthen the forces supporting the policy of contain­
ment. Serious thought was given to rearming Western Germany 
itself.9^
92  ^ 93Bundy, p. 255. Ibid.
94Norman A. Graebner, "Dean G. Acheson," An Uncertain 
Tradition, (ed.) Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 267-288.
9^Rostow, p. 217-258.
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Service forces in the United States were increased from
1,500,000 to 3,500,000 and have since been maintained at
about the,3,000,000 level. The military budget rose from
$12,000,000,000 annually to $41,000,000,000 and also has
since leveled off at about the same figure. Finally,
foreign aid rose from $4,500,000,000 annually to
$7,100,000,000, but has since tapered off into the
96$3,000,000,000 category.
In short, Korea positively convinced American 
leaders of the long term threat posed by Communism,and 
acted as a catylst in the implementation of further long- 
range manpower and monetary tactics designed to stop the 
Sino-Soviet Bloc on its existing borders.
96 F. R. Dulles, p. 259. Also, Rostow, pp. 235-236.
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CHAPTER III 
THE U. S. POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION
The Eisenhower Republicans alleged during the
presidential campaign of 1952 that the Democrats had failed
to concoct a positive foreign policy vis-a-vis Soviet Russia
since World War II. In contrast, General Eisenhower and his
future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, promised to
move from the negative or defensive to the positive or
offensive policy and concurrently .to balance the federal 
1
budget. On taking office, however, President Eisenhower
found that the issue of a peace or truce in Korea was still
the predominant issue in foreign affairs and that its
successful conclusion was prerequisite to concentration on
2
foreign affairs elsewhere.
In an effort to force the North Korean and Chinese 
representatives to the United Nations mediation table in
1
Eisenhower, pp. 127-130. Also, Rostow, pp.' 301-304
2
C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift, " Fortune, 
March, 1965, p. 112 . Hereafter referred to as Murphy. 
According to McGeorge Bundy, Murphy and William Donovan were 
privy to official government papers not available to other 
writers, hence can be considered most authoritative.
Seoul, the United States under its new president quickly
enlarged the standing army in South Korea from twelve to
sixteen divisions and removed the Seventh Fleet shield
from the Straits of Formosa.3 Both of these actions were
taken with the objective in mind of causing Red China to
augment its trained manpower in the two critical areas.
Hopefully, these tactics would make a peace in Korea more
desirable than ever before for the Communists. In addition,
Secretary of State Dulles resorted to a maneuver later to be
known as the "brinkmanship" tactic when he used the "thinly
veiled threat" of a retaliatory atomic bomb attack if the
Chinese persisted in ignoring and boycotting truce negotia- 
' 4tions. Although the president exercised extreme restraint 
and was quite concerned that the threat might alienate our 
allies as well as the neutrals of the world, it did prove 
effective at a time when the United States enjoyed.a clear 
thermonuclear weapon advantage. By June of 1953, the State 
Department had both the truce negotiations with China and fiery 
President Rhee of South Korea under control to the extent 
that there was little danger of further escalation of the
3Ibid., p. 230.
^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1-961), p. 98. See also Peeters, 
pp. 18-19.
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5
conflict in Korea.
The two major powers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union viewed the results of the Korean conflict in 
completely different ways. Russia became convinced that 
military aggression could not succeed against the power of 
containment enhanced by indigenous troops armed under the 
auspices and bached by the nuclear power of the United States. 
Therefore, her thoughts and efforts turned for the moment 
toward ideological conflict and diplomatic maneuvering.
Perhaps parodoxically, the United States felt that an 
enhanced military capability and defense pacts with rimland
free nations would continue to be the most effective way to
6
contain Communism.
With Korea under control, the new administration put
renewed emphasis on a second major objective, that of
extending the "system of alliances" around the "periphery of
7
the Iron Curtain. " In the Pacific theater, the Truman 
Administration had already completed a security treaty with
5
Adams, pp. 99-102. "Escalation" is a journalistic 
invention of recent vintage which means "the introduction of 
more destructive weapons or more troops in a conflict."
6
Rostow, p. 325.
7
Eisenhower, pp. 446-447. Both political parties m  
the presidential election of 1952 had advocated the continuance 
of American leadership of the free world and the policy of 
collective security. See R. F. Foster, pp. 266-267.
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Japan which included the use of certain Japanese bases.
Similarly, a bilateral treaty with the Philippines was
already in effect, as was the pact with Australia and
New Zealand, popularly known as ANZUS. In September 1954,
Secretary Dulles extended the ANZUS pact to include Britain>
France, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand and called
the new organization the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,
known popularly as SEATO, the Pacific guardian organization
8
against Communist aggression.
In Europe and indeed in the United States itself 
there had been much opposition to the Korean War on the 
grounds that it could easily lead to a general war in Asia, 
when in fact the important area which deserved primary
focus of interest should be Europe. To placate those 
persons with such opinions, a European Defense Community 
pact was signed in May 1952 which brought West Germany into
the Brussels Pact family for defensive purposes. In return 
for her partial sovereignty, Germany was to contribute 500,000
United States received permission in 1953 for the use of
9
10
men for the common defense of Europe In addition, the
8 9
Reitzel, pp. 311-312. Ibid., p . 283.
10
Spanier, p. 64
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military bases in Spain which would ultimately be utilized
as forward bases for strategic bombers and nuclear 
11
submarines.
In the Middle East, the Truman administration had
successfully brought Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in March, 1952. Secretary Dulles took up
the project where Secretary Acheson had left off.‘ He
extended it to the eastern extremity of the Southeast Treaty
Organization with the conclusion of a defense pact in March
1955, supported by the United States, which included Turkey,
12
Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.
Of even greater importance than the enhancement of
the collective security concept on the rimland was the
direct security of the United States, because economically, .
politically, and militarily, the United States represented
the heart and soul of resistance to Communism and as such
13
its defense was the sine qua non. Recognizing this, the 
Eisenhower administration proceeded to put its military
11
Reitzel,' p. 310-311.
12
Ibid. See Appendix D for a graphic display of the 
aggregate of collective security organizations and defense 
pacts on the Soviet periphery.
13 ■
Reitzel, p. 336.
forces in order and to establish planning objectives for the 
future. An early analysis of the status of rearmament within 
the three services revealed that the Air Force was planning 
its strategy and forces for a nuclear war, while the Army
14
and Navy were concentrating efforts on non-nuclear forces.
After several exhaustive studies regarding roles 
and missions and military commitments, basically two alter­
native plans evolved. Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a strategic mobile 
reserve of army power, supported by naval and air power. 
Secretary Dulles supported the alternative viewpoint, 
developed within the National Security Council, that United
States' retaliation should rely primarily on atomic weapons
15
with minimum emphasis on ground army power. This posi­
tion of the National Security Council was undoubtedly influ­
enced by a study performed by a retired Brigadier General, 
Robert Cutler, who headed a team of distinguished former 
military and civilian authorities. Cutler later recalled 
that in reaching a decision on the matter, that
14
Adams, p . 398.
15
Rostow, p. 305 and p. 249. See also Paul Y. 
Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), p. 365.
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The President's thinking was from the beginning 
heavily influenced by concern that any serious 
prolongation of the huge military programs of 
the kind then underway and in contemplation must 
inevitably turn the U. S. into a garrison state 
...Before his inaugeration and later....the 
considerations that controlled the President's 
judgment were, first, the working up of a strategy 
for the "long haul" that would be within the 
nation's capacity to pay and, second, a defensive 
and retaliatory power of such overawing strength 
as to deter the possibility of attack upon this 
country.
The President further emphasized that expenditures for
military preparedness should remain within the boundary
established by a balanced national budget when he said in
his State-of-the-Union message of February 2, 1953, that
"Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength
17 ■
within the limits of endurable strain...." Faced with
the dilemma of several alternative military strategies as
championed by the respective services, yet desirous of
balancing the budget, President Eisenhower "cleared away
some of .../the/ underbrush by ordering the Pentagon to
assume that if we got into war it would be fought with
18
nuclear weapons."
There followed several speeches on the part of 
Secretary Dulles in bringing this policy to maturity. In
16C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift, " Fortune, 
March, 1965.
17 18
Ibid. Adams, p. 398.
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June of 1953/ he announced to the cabinet that
Our deterrent, against the Russians.. .was a 
retaliatory striking force that could be 
launched quickly from bases near the enemy 
and this meant that the United States must 
maintain such bases on foreign soil in 
various distant parts of the world....19
The world was officially informed in detail of the
American policy of massive retaliation by the Secretary's
speech on the night of January 12, 1954, to the Council of
Foreign Relations in New York City:
The way...is to place more reliance upon community 
deterrent power, and less dependence upon local 
defensive power...Local defense must be reinforced 
by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory 
power....The way to deter aggression is for the 
free community to be willing and able to respond 
vigorously at places and with means of its own
choosing.2 0
As initially defined, the new policy therefore consisted of 
a rimland solidly allied with the United States and charged 
with the task of maintaining local army forces but backed by 
the airpower of the United States, standing ready to respond
19Ibid., pp. 103. Mr. Adams was paraphrasing from 
notes taken at the cabinet meeting.
^ The New York Times, January 13, 1954. The 
President's State of the Union Speech on January 7, 1954, had 
alluded to the new doctrine: "We...will maintain a massive 
capability to strike back." See Robert J. Donovan,
Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1956), p. 326.
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instantly with atomic weapons. The local forces became 
known as the Shield, while the retaliatory nuclear forces 
became known as the Sword. 2.1
Dulles extolled the virtues of the new policy by
citing its success in bringing the Korean truce negotiations
to final settlement. He concluded that "The lesson /of
Korea/ is this: If events are likely which will in fact
lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in
advance; then we shall probably not have to fight."22 In
April 1954, Secretary Dulles also cited the policy's success
23in keeping Red China from intervening in Indo-China; 
however, with the loss of North Vietnam by the French at
/'
Dien Ben Phu the exclusion of Red China from Vietnam must 
have been a hollow victory at best.
In spite of the Secretary's enthusiasm for the
policy, the ominous spectre of Soviet equality in
^Abshire, David M. and Allen, Richard V. (ed's), 
National Security (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
1963), p. 278. See also Rostow, p. 306.
^ State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, September 14, 
1953, p. 339. Secretary Dulles delivered the speech to the 
American Legion in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 2, 1953.
23John pm Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace, " 
Foreign Affairs, April, 1954, pp. 3 53-364. A third accom­
plishment of the "New Look" was the reduction of manpower 
in the services from 3.2 million in early 1955 to 2.85
million by June 1956. See Donovan, p. 326.
7 3
thermonuclear technology appeared on the free world's
horizon in the summer of 1953 when Russia exploded its
24
first high yield weapon. Admittedly, the Soviets did 
not at the time or .even in early 1954 have a means or 
system for the delivery of such a weapon, such as a bomber 
or a missile, but even her first successful test caused •
jitters in the free community and a rather immediate modifi­
cation of the basic precepts of American massive retaliatory 
policies. In April 1954 Secretary Dulles announced that
massive retaliation
,j_.may not have__the same significance forever.
/The free world/...must not put itself in the 
position where the only response open to it is 
general war. /Required is/...a system in which 
local defensive strength is reinforced by more 
mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so 
will vary according to the character of the 
various areas...That does not mean turning 
every local war into a world war. .’.The point is 
that a prospective attacker is not likely to 
invade if he believes the pro^gble hurt will 
outbalance the probable gain.
While the State Department was thus conceiving and
later modifying the massive retaliatory policy in the effort
26
to more emphatically contain Communism, the Soviets were
24
Adams, p . 109.
25
J. F. Dulles, Foreign Affairs, April, 1954.
26
Adams, p. 87.
concurrently adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards
27
the United States. The death of Premier Stalin in 1953
and the subsequent fight within the Kremlin for succession 
undoubtedly contributed to the lack of Russian activity on 
the international scene between 1953 and mid-1955. Certainly 
the Soviet leaders wanted time to perfect an inter-continental 
ballistic missile and initiate deployment of these weapons 
with nuclear warheads prior to any further serious confron­
tation with the United States. Last but not least in 
causing this lull in American-Soviet confrontations in the 
period was the system of defense pacts newly created and
now literally surrounding the Sino-Soviet Bloc except across
28
the northern tier. By the middle of 1955 the lull had
convinced American leaders that there was no immediate
threat of a general nuclear war with Russia although the
accidental war or the limited war were always recognized as
possibilities which required constant attention. This
reasoning also recognized that the Soviet threat required
analysis as to outcome and effect over the long-duration 
29
period, including not only military and technological 
considerations, but economic and social as well. While thus
27
Rostow, p. 32 5.
28
Ibid. Also pp. 281-292.
exploring means to develop and/or maintain close rapport 
with allied nations and seeking for the first time to 
seriously compete with Communism for the favor of undeveloped 
new nations, the policy of massive retaliation came apart at 
the seams. These other nations began to see the unilateral 
aspects of the American retaliatory policy and could not 
bring themselves to believe that it would actually be invoked 
against similarly potent Soviet Russia. Nor could they 
morally condone its use except in a situation which necessi­
tated nuclear response to a Soviet pre-emptive attack and 
only then after consultation with the entire free-world 
community rather than on the existing unilateral basis.^0 
Although Secretary Dulles initially defended his unilateral
O 1
policy, popularly referred to as brinkmanship, in October, 
1957, he further modified his basic policy by saying
10Ibid., pp. 322-323, p. 350, and p. 444. General 
Eisenhower, as Commander of NATO in 1953 had.already faced 
this same problem of resentment among our European allies 
for not having access to atomic secrets and weapons. See 
Rostow, p. 319.
31Adams, p. 118. In an interview with James Shepley 
of Life and Time, Sec. Dulles said that "Some say that we 
were brought to the verge of war /in threatening to enlarge 
the Korean War, on the Indo-China situation, and on the ques­
tion of Formosa/....We walked to the brink and we looked it 
in the face. We took strong action....0"
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In the future it may thus be feasible to place 
less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory 
power. It may be possible to defend countries by 
nuclear weapons so mobile /tactical weapon/7, or 
so placed as to mate military invasion with 
conventional forces a hazardous attempt.32
So ended the clear-cut American policy of massive
retaliation. In retrospect it is rather ironic that the
policy was actually valid between about 1945 and 1950 when
the United States in fact had an atomic monopoly, and had not
publicly suggested that it might be used; yet when formally
announced to the world in 1954, it was no longer valid. J
SUMMIT TALKS AND CONFRONTATIONS
The less-aggressive Soviet policy of 1953-1956 gave 
promise that the problems posed by bipolarization might be 
solved through the use of meetings among .the heads of state 
of major powers in the world. Churchill had suggested such 
a meeting immediately after the death of Stalin in 1953, but 
to no avail. However, by 1955 the political climate had
3 ?J John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in 
United States Policy," Foreign Affairs, October, 1957, p. 31.
JJDean G. Acheson, "The Premises of American Policy, " 
American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, ed's. Walter C. Hahn 
and John C. Neff (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960),
p. 416.
mellowed to the point that direct negotiations seemed 
possible. The first such meeting of heads of state 
convened on July 16, 1955, at Geneva. President Eisenhower 
represented the United States and formally proposed that the 
group, including Great Britain, France, and the Soviet 
Union, accept an "Open Skies" concept, whereby each nation 
would exchange basic data regarding military installations 
with the others and additionally be permitted aerial
34reconnaissance of military areas for inspection purposes. 
Nothing productive was forthcoming from Geneva. The Soviet 
Union maintained her Iron Curtain. George Kennan later 
wrote that the meeting at Geneva failed because "no intimacy 
of understanding is really possible," since the Russians
3 5refuse to look at the facts with any degree of "objectivity."
In the period of two or three years following 
Geneva, there occurred several new confrontations between 
the United States and Soviet Russia on the rimlahd with the 
balance of thermonuclear power still favoring the Americans 
but by a margin quite unclear. Soviet Russia took advantage
^Eisenhower, pp. 505-511. See Reitzel, pp. 400-401 
for a summary of events leading up to the Summit meeting.
Also, Donovan, p. 344.
35Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, pp. 20-27<>
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of the uncertainty to employ the threat of her own retaliation
on several occasions.
The first such confrontation occurred over the Suez
Crisis which resulted from British and French efforts to
depose Nasser and counter-mand Egypt's nationalization of
36
the Suez Canal. The report on October 31, 1956, that
British aircraft from Cyprus had bombed Egypt was a complete
37
surprise to President Eisenhower. Soviet leaders
threatened military reprisals against Western Europe,
implying the use of missiles. At the expense of the loss of
considerable prestige within the ranks of her allies, the
United States "joined the Russians and the Arab-Asian Block
38
in raising the hue and cry against its friends." With the
realization 'that their efforts against Egypt were being
opposed both by the Soviet and American governments, no
alternative remained open to England and France except a ■
cease-fire. As a result of the cease-fire, Premier Nasser's
39
pro-Communist regime in Egypt remained intact.
36
Dean G. Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 110-116.,
3 7
Adams, p. 2 55. Also, Public Papers of the 
President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956.
(U. S. Printing Office, 1958), p. 282.
38
Acheson, pp. 110-116. Also, see Adams, p. 257, 
and Rostow, pp. 3 58-3 59.
39
Ibid.
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Virtually concurrent with the Suez Crisis was the
Hungarian revolt which was initiated on October 23, 1956.
Even though this was apparently more of an internal affair
for Soviet Russia than the Suez Crisis, Soviet leaders made
it clear that no outside interference would be permitted.
Even though the ill-fated Hungarian revolutionary force made
repeated requests by radio for Allied assistance, no assistance
was permitted, and the revolt collapsed when revolutionary
forces were attacked by Soviet tanks on November 4th.^
In a diplomatic move designed to stop Nasser in the
Middle East and also to enforce the containment policy
against Communism in the same area, President Eisenhower
announced a new policy on January 5, 1957, which became
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. It proposed
...that the U. S. ...cooperate with and 
assist any nation...of the Middle East in the 
development of economic strength dedicated to 
the maintenance of national independence...
/to include/ military assistance.. ./and/... 
employment of the armed forces of the United 
States... against overt armed aggression from 
any nation controlled by International 
Commun i sm. ^
^Adams, p. 2 57.
41Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 12-13. Anthony Eden, 
British Prime Minister during the Suez Crisis, said that 
the Eisenhower Doctrine "helped to show that the West was 
not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltration 
and subversion by others." See Anthony Eden, The Memoirs 
of Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1960), p. 646.
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In April, 1957, when Jordan requested assistance
under the terms of the new doctrine, the United States
responded by dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the eastern
Mediterranean and by providing Jordan $10,000,000 for her
army and economy. But these steps provided only
temporary relief. In July of 1958, the internal situation
in both Jordan and Lebanon deteriorated to the point where
direct intervention was required. British paratroopers
landed in Jordan and 14,000 American soldiers were landed
by naval vessels on the shores of Lebanon.^3 soviet veiled
threats to use ballistic missiles notwithstanding,^ the
stability of the governments of Jordan and Lebanon was
preserved and eventually in October, 1958, Allied troops
were withdrawn.^5
In 1959 the crisis scene shifted to Germany, with the
Soviet Union again demanding Allied withdrawal from Berlin.
Kruschev's announcement to the press said that
If the Western powers disagree with our proposals, 
that will not stop us. When the time /of six 
months7 expires, we will im 
as stated in our documents.
42Adams, p. 289. 43Bailey, p. 851.
^^Hans Speier, Divided Berlin, The Anatomy of Soviet 
Political Blackmail (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publisher, 1960), pp. 28-29.
glement our proposals
45Bailey, p. 851. ^Speier, p. 35.
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On June 23, 1959, he announced to the United States that
Your generals talk of maintaining your position 
in Berlin by force. That is bluff. If you
4 7want war...our rockets will fly automatically. 
Although Mr. Krushchev's threats came to naught as the 
deadline passed, his remarks ushered in the international 
condition which still confronts us today - the balance of 
terror.
THE BALANCE OF TERROR''
President Truman said before departing from the 
White House in 1953: "The war of the future would be one
in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one
blow...Such a war is not a possible policy for rational
48 49men." His nucleomitophobia, or fear of atomic attack,
undoubtedly stemmed from his study of the probable effects 
of nuclear weapons in a general war. In order to under­
stand even to a small degree what the balance of terror 
really means, it is important to understand the probable 
effects of thermonuclear bombs. For instance, the
47
Ibid., p . 30.
48
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, January 
19, 1953, p. 94.
49
Arthur Herzog, The War Peace Establishment (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 263.
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radiation effects alone of a one megaton thermonuclear bomb
50
equal that of about one million tons of radium. In
addition to the fallout effect of such radiation, a
population must contend with blast, thermal effects, and
secondary fires. One of the leading experts on this
subject, Herman Kahn, has estimated that if Soviet Russia
launched a nuclear attack against American urban-industrial
complexes, between 75 percent and 100 percent of the
51
population would be killed. Soviet Major General N.
Talensky said basically the same thing in 1960:
...nuclear war would mean that human society 
would be set back and that the road to 
Communism would be immeasurably lengthened.
A second major point to be understood even before
defining the balance in terror is the correlation between
the physical size of a nation and the degree to which its
citizens suffer from nucleomitophobia. It was almost
unnecessary for Soviet Marshal Vasilevsky to inform the
British that
50
Hahn and Neff, p. 2 57. Figures are derived from 
a U. S. government document, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.
51
Herman Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable (New York: 
Horizon Press, 1962), p. 61.
52
Speier, pp. 44-45, quoting from Soviet Magazine, 
International Affairs.
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. ... atomic and hydrogen bombs . . .are particularly 
dangerous for countries with a small territory 
and a large population.53
What this really means is that all things being equal, the
balance of power tends to favor the nation whose population
and industrial capacities are spread out over the largest
area.
With the break in the American monopoly on 
thermonuclear weapon technology and the means of delivery 
in the late 1950's, the Free World was faced with a
54
situation that offered at best only equality with Communism.
This fact has, of necessity, dominated all decisions since
that time which were related to national security, including
foreign policy with Soviet Russia. This balanced condition
constitutes considerably more than merely the capability for
each of the two societies to launch massive nuclear attacks
against each other, and although the balance is related to
and affected by respective defensive environments, it is to
a much greater degree related to the deterrent capability of
55
each of the adversaries. "To deter an attack means being
53
Acheson, p. 100, quoting from Pravda, December 4,
1954.
54
Reitzel, pp. 327-329.
55Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punish­
ment (Princeton University Center of International Studies,
1959), p. 43.
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able to strike back in spite of it. A balance of
terror exists when each side has such a capability to
strike second and still inflict unacceptable damage on the 
57other side. A more finite description has been provided 
by Herman Kahn who reasons as follows: If Country A fires
all of its missiles, for example, 2000, at Country JB's 1020 
missile sites, he will destroy perhaps 1000 of them, but 
subsequently Country 13 will launch its remaining 2 0 at 
Country A and kill 20 percent of Country A's population.
Under such conditions even a pre-emptive or surprise attack 
becomes the worst possible national strategic alternative.
Our rimland allies, particularly in industrial Europe, 
have recognized the sterility of the nuclear retaliatory 
policy vis-a-vis Communist aggression.; yet they still recog­
nize its necessity as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear 
capability. However, since the balance of terror greatly
-^Albert Wolhstetter, "The Delicate Balance of 
Terror," American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, (ed's),
Walter C. Hahn and John C. Neff (Garden City: Doubleday &
Co., Inc., 1960), p. 199.
^ Snyder, p. 97.
^Klaus, Knorr and Thornton Read (ed's.), Limited 
Strategic War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
1962), p. 48, quoting Herman Kahn's essay, "Some Comments 
on Controlled War."
reduces the probability of employment of nuclear power, the 
defense against other forms of armed aggression becomes a 
more serious problem.
American security planning has also taken this
conclusion into account. As early as 1955, the then Army
Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor, began to prepare United
States Army forces for limited ground wars in support of
national objectives as a substitute for the unappliable
59
force of the atom.
Unfortunately, the requirement for the graduated 
response or limited war capability has not lessened the 
requirement for the technique or situation known as 
nuclear umbrella, for it remains the sine qua non. Maintaining 
a viable and credible nuclear deterrence, capable of response 
even after being attacked by the. enemy, requires excellence 
in nuclear technology and weapon systems 1 survivability 
against enemy defenses. A continuing, major effort by the 
American populace is required in the future to assure a 
"strike second" deterrence second to none.
59
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), pp. 130-180. See 
also Rostow, p. 322, Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West, 
p. 56, and James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), pp. 92-17 7.
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CONCLUSIONS
Bipolarization of world power between 1945 and 1947 
and the ensuing Cold War caused the pendulum of American 
foreign policy with the Soviet Union to swing from the 
wartime alliance to one advocating containment on the rimland 
backed by the threat of nuclear power. Soviet postwar 
objectives to eliminate American influence from Japan and 
Europe and to implant Communism in the Middle East, Southeast 
Asia, and Africa*^ had been thwarted by Free World policies 
which had established collective security on the rimland from 
the 38th Parallel in Korea, to Formosa, to Southeast Asia, to 
the Baghdad Pact, and finally to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.
In 1953 as equilibrium was reached in nuclear tech­
nology, the pendulum moved back a little towards the center 
with the establishment of a mutual suicide pact or balance of 
terror. This balance placed prime emphasis in both camps 
on obtaining the favor of uncommitted and undeveloped new 
nations who because of the courting by the two competitors 
could afford to be quite demanding in playing one against
60Rostow, pp. 261-262
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the other. Some American leaders found it difficult to
condone the sometimes indifferent, sometimes arrogant
attitude displayed by the recipients of the $3,000,000,000
"1annual outlay of aid funds. Yet the courting continued, 
by necessity, for it was recognized that marriage with 
uncommitted nations could be decisive in determining the
/* q
eventual outcome of the East-West struggle. This 
conclusion takes on increased significance as additional 
nations become technically capable of producing and 
delivering thermonuclear weapons.
Concurrent with Soviet parity in nuclear technology 
was the rapid expansion of her industrial capability.
Although a true balance does not yet exist, she is admittedly 
second only to the United States and should she be capable of 
integrating all Communist economic might into a commonwealth, 
her market would be even larger than the combined North
x
6 3American and Western European markets.
^Herbert Feins, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 55.
^Reitzel, p. 317. See also Baruch, pp. 409-410.
^Isaac Deutscher, The Great Conflict (Oxford 
University Press, 1960), pp. 50-51. See also Kennan, Russia, 
the Atom and the West, p. 2.
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Soviet advances in technology were emphasized by
initial leadership in space activities. On October 4, 1957,
the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial
64satellite vehicle. Sputnik I. In the race to gain the
favor of uncommitted and undeveloped nations, the publicity
and prestige associated with such a feat produced marked
effects. The United States respect for the threat posed by
Soviet technology increased considerably0 President Eisenhower
took action to accelerate dispersal programs for Strategic Air
Command bombers, sought improved and longer range warning
devices, initiated research for a defense against missiles,
and approved additional long-range missiles for the United
65States arsenal.
In the same speech which announced improvements in
the American arsenal, President Eisenhower told of American
reaction to Sputnik as follows:
. . a We know of their /.Soviet/ vigorous education 
system and their technological achievements...
When such competence in things material is at the 
service of leaders who have so little regard for
^Martin Caidin, Overture to Space (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1963), p. 122.
^^State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, December 2, 
1957, pp. 867-871. The President made the speech at Oklahoma 
City on November 13th0
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things human, and who command the power of an empire, 
there is danger ahead for free men everywhere. That, 
my friends, is the reason why the American people 
have been so aroused about the earth satellite...The 
world will witness future discoveries even more 
startling than that of nuclear fission. The question 
is: Will we be the ones to make them?^
Concurrently, the President requested increased endeavors 
on the part of American scientists to place our own satellite in 
orbit.^ When this was successfully accomplished on January 31, 
1958, the Space Race, as an adjunct to the Cold War, was 
officially underway.
The Soviet industrial growth and technological develop­
ment has enforced the deterrent value of American strike-second 
capabilities, because now the Soviet leaders have come to regard 
their industrial base as their prized possession. Whereas in 
World War II, Stalin could afford to somewhat disregard popula­
tion losses, today's leaders cannot disregard the possibilities 
of the loss of the industrial base.
Finally, by 1959 the United States had recognized that 
the balance of terror demanded other military alternatives in 
addition to nuclear response and consequently had initiated a 
build-up of limited war forces. She also had recognized that
^ Ibido
67Ibid.
68Caidin, p. 274.
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the cold war problem embraced not only military strategy,
but the entire gamut of political, scientific (including
competition in space), and ideological strategies as well.
As Herman Kahn has so aptly written:
Clemenceau: 'War is too important to be left
to the generals.'
A. Wohlstetter: 'Peace is too important to be
left to the generals.*69
69Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable, p. 32.
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL DEFENSE, FOREIGN AID AND 
MILITARY AID EXPENDITURES 
1946-1955
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, 1947 PRICES)
GNP ^
NATIONAL
DEFENSE
MILITARY
AID
FOREK
AID
1946 233 .8 21.2 .07 6.0
1947 232 .2 12 .2 .04 6.6
1948 243 .9 11.2 .3 4.6
1949 241.5 12 .8 .2 5.7
1950 264.7 12 .7 .5 3 .8
1951 282 .9 27.0 1.5 2.6
1952 293 .3 36.8 2.6 1.8
1953. 306.5 38.9 4.3 1.2
1954 300.5 32.4 3.1 .9
1955 318.8 29.8 2 .2 1.5
AUTHORITY: Reitzel et al, pp. 379 and 481, quoting from
data of U. S. Department of Commerce, "Survey 
of Current Business."
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